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ABSTRACT 
The United States has made use of economic sanctions to achieve political goals 
by limiting the relationship between trade, travel, and finance. However, economists are 
uncertain if the use of economic sanctions is effective and achieves the desired results. 
Applying the notion of demand-based inoperability, we present two nonlinear models to 
identify the optimal placement of sanctions and assess the sanctions’ cascading effects to 
all sectors of an adversary’s economy. For purposes of demonstration and validation, we 
pose a hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. considers trade sanctions on Canada. 
Specifically, our analysis proposes the Trade Sanction Inoperability Input-Output Model 
(TS-IIM). We devised this model to permit ranking of sectors by the order in which the 
greatest production loss occurs. Given the strong dependence of Canada on the United 
States, is it reasonable to expect that a sanction could result in economic repercussions? 
In response to this question, we also present the Inter-Country Inoperability Input-Output 
Model (IC-IIM), which extends the TS-IIM by considering the reduction in trade in value 
added (TiVA) the U.S. economy will experience. Our results from the TS-IIM and IC-
IIM lead us to conclude that the proper design of a sanction considers not only the impact 
to an adversary’s economy, but also sanction’s associated repercussions at home.  
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Over the past 20 years, the United States has made use of economic sanctions to 
impose higher costs on adversaries and achieve political goals by limiting the relationship 
between trade, travel and finance. However, economists are uncertain if the use of 
economic sanctions is effective in achieving the desired results (Cortright and Lopez 
2000).  
This thesis takes up the challenge of assessing and improving the design of an 
economic sanction. We define an economic sanction in this thesis as a restriction that 
eliminates the imports into the United States from a particular foreign country. Our 
analysis is based on the use of an extended version of the demand-based inoperability 
input-output model (IIM), as described by Santos (2003). This model measures impact on 
an economy in terms of inoperability, which is defined as normalized production loss as a 
direct result of a disruption to an industry within the economy. Moreover, it considers a 
demand-side perturbation, which is defined as a reduction in demand for commodities 
produced from a particular sector or set of sectors. The design of an economic sanction, 
in the context of this thesis, is the selection of the sector or set of sectors to sanction.   
We propose two optimization models. The first, the Trade Sanction Inoperability 
Input-output Model (TS-IIM), selects the sector or set of sectors that, if sanctioned, 
maximizes production loss (i.e., inoperability) to an adversary. The second, which we 
named the Inter-Country Inoperability Input-Output Model (IC-IIM), has the same 
objective function of the TS-IIM, but it includes a maximum tolerance threshold on the 
repercussions to the United States. 
Using data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), we consider a hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. considers trade sanctions 
on Canada. Using the TS-IIM reveals that United States sanctions on the Canadian 
automotive industry would create a $193.3 billion production loss to the Canadian 
economy. This is not surprising, as the Canadian automotive industry is the largest 
contributor of GDP for Canada. In addition, the U.S. is the largest importer of 
 xvi
automobiles and automotive parts from Canada due to the Automotive Product Trade 
Agreement (Auto Pact) established between the U.S. and Canada in 1965, as expanded by 
the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 (CVMA 2011).  
Given the interdependency between the U.S. and Canadian economies, we also 
consider repercussions on the United States for sanctioning sectors within Canada. We 
use the IC-IIM to identify sanctions while also limiting the repercussions to the United 
States. Results from the IC-IIM indicate that the sectors identified by the TS-IIM would 
cause large repercussions. Using parametric analysis on the threshold for possible 
repercussions, a sanction of the Canadian automotive sector is never part of an optimal 
solution provided from the IC-IIM. 
The models and analysis used in this thesis can be adapted for use by the U.S. 
Department of State to combat the financing of terrorism and the hostile actions of our 
adversaries. Creating inoperability by means of sanctions can limit the production of 
commodities and cash flow from certain sectors critical to the sustainment of our 
adversary’s military infrastructure. Sanctions have the ability to mitigate war; or, if 
necessary, sanctions may be the source of a competitive edge.  
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A. BACKGROUND  
In response to the support of terrorism, abuse of human rights, and development 
of nuclear programs in direct violation of nuclear treaties, the United States (U.S.) has 
been involved with numerous economic sanctions on countries around the world. 
According to Masters 2015, an economic sanction is defined as “the withdrawal of 
customary trade and financial relations for foreign and security policy purposes (Masters 
2015). In the 1990s, over 50 sanctions were implemented, and this decade was referred to 
by many as the “sanctions decade.” Of these sanctions, 12 were implemented by the 
United Nations Security Council; all of the remaining sanctions were implemented by the 
United States.   
One of the most notable recent sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran was 
Executive Order 13599 signed by President Obama in February 2012. This sanction 
isolated the bank, effectively disrupting the export of Iranian oil to other countries by 
terminating the means of payment. The U.S. targeted the Central Bank of Iran because 
most of the revenue generated from Iranian oil sales is processed through this bank. As of 
2016, the U.S. has sanctions imposed against 23 countries, including Crimea, Syria, and 
North Korea (U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control 2016). 
However, the U.S. has also recently relaxed sanctions against Iran and Cuba as part of 
ongoing negotiations with these countries.   
Because the United States has sharply increased the frequency of its use of 
sanctions as a diplomatic tool to influence nations, it is important to assess the extent to 
which sanctions work as intended. 
Numerous economists, politicians, and humanitarians argue that economic 
sanctions are not effective political trade tools. For example, Cortright and Lopez (2000) 
studied the effectiveness of sanctions by reviewing their aftereffects once imposed 
as compared to the initial objectives. Their framework for evaluating the effectiveness 
of a sanction is based on the political, economic, and humanitarian impact on the 
 
 2
nation sanctioned. The authors concluded that the sanctions imposed by the United 
Nations in the 1990s were often ineffective, due primarily to their poor implementation, 
enforcement, or design. Cortright and Lopez  also recommended the creation of an 
expert entity whose purpose is to measure the impact sanctions may have on a foreign 
nation (2000). 
B. MOTIVATION 
This thesis takes up the challenge of assessing and improving the design of 
economic sanctions. We define an economic sanction in this thesis as a restriction that 
reduces or eliminates the imports into the United States from a particular foreign country. 
As a concrete example, in Table 1 is shown the trade volume between the United States 
and Iran for each month in the years 2004 and 2014 (U.S. Census Bureau 2004, 2014). 
Specifically, import volume, export volume, and the trade balance in millions of U.S. 
dollars (USD) between the U.S. and Iran are presented. The last row entitled “TOTAL” 
shows the aggregate trade activity over the course of each year in millions of USD. One 
observes that there is a two-way trade relationship between the United States and Iran in 
2004 but not in 2014. When comparing the two periods, total U.S. exports to Iran 
increased by 119%. However, because of the steady increase in sanction activity between 
2010 and 2014, there was no import activity from Iran to the United States in 2014.  
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Table 1.   2004 vs. 2014 U.S. Trade in Goods with Iran. 
Adapted from U.S. Census Bureau (2004, 2014). 
 
Table 1 shows the effects economic sanctions has on Iranian imports to the U.S. within the period of a 
decade.  
Assessing the differences in trade activity, specifically the restriction of imports 
from a particular country, is the topic of study for this thesis. We focus on disrupting 
exogenous demand of commodities from industries within a particular country’s 
economy by means of sanctions. Sanctions can be implemented unilaterally, or 
multilaterally. A unilateral sanction is a sanction implemented by a single country, while 
a multilateral sanction is imposed by two or more countries. These countries may be 
cooperating or acting independently in imposing sanctions.  
Sanctions are implemented by limiting trade for specific sectors within an 
economy. Building on previous work, we define a sector of an economy as a group of 
similar industries, products, or services that are aggregated together and treated as a 
single commodity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) uses 34 standard sectors to characterize economic activity for all countries 
within its database. 
In this thesis, we define the design of a sanction in terms of: 
 Which sector(s) of an economy to target, and 
 Whether that sanction is carried out unilaterally or multilaterally. 
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We primarily restrict attention to the potential effectiveness of unilateral sanctions 
imposed by the United States. 
We measure the effectiveness of a design in terms of production loss in USD.   
We extend the inoperability input-output model (IIM) as described in Santos (2003) to 
quantify inoperability, which is a point estimate of the resulting normalized production 
loss for the sanctioned country experienced by foreign nations after an economic sanction 
has been implemented by the United States. 
C. SCOPE OF THESIS 
We present the trade sanction inoperability input-output model (TS-IIM) to 
identify the optimal design of an economic trade sanction based on the resulting 
estimated production loss experienced by an adversary’s economy. Our model extends 
the IIM of Santos (2003) so that we maximize production loss. We populate this model 
with data from the OECD. We use this extended model to consider the following 
questions: 
1. Which sector of an adversary’s economy should be targeted to maximize 
the impact on its economy as a whole? 
2. Which sector of an adversary’s economy should be targeted to maximize 
the impact on a specific sector? 
3. To what extent are trade sanctions effective tools for economic warfare? 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provides 
background information and a review of the relevant literature. Chapter III presents a 
model for targeting the sectors of an adversary’s economy based on the estimated impact 
on that economy. Chapter IV extends this model to consider possible economic 
ramifications to the U.S. as well. Chapter V summarizes our findings and describes topics 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews several families of models used to study sector 
interdependence and economic inoperability. 
A. THE LEONTIEF INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
Perhaps the most well-known macroeconomic model of sector interdependence is 
the input-output model created by Wassily Leontief for which he won the Nobel Prize for 
Economics in 1973 (Nobel Media AB 2014). In the Leontief model, the economy of a 
country is partitioned into n industrial sectors. The core of the model is an n  n 
technology matrix where each element ,i ja  is a coefficient that represents the amount of 
production from sector i that is consumed to produce one unit of commodity in sector j. 
The model has an inherent linear assumption; the amount of sector i consumed to produce 
each additional unit from sector j remains constant. In other words, this model does not 
account for economies of scale. Despite the linear assumption, this model is the standard 
used by numerous developed countries, including the U.S., for the purpose of planning 
and forecasting specific econometrics such as gross domestic product (GDP) (Horowitz 
and Planting 2006). Within the U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) uses this model to analyze national and regional economies 
within the U.S. The analysis by the BEA answers questions regarding the U.S. 
economy’s growth, development, and interindustry relationships, as well as its relative 
rank within the world. In addition, the Office for National Statistics (ONS)—the largest 
independent producer of national statistics in the United Kingdom (UK)—uses this model 
for the UK in the same way that the BEA does for the United States. 
B. INOPERABILITY INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS 
Santos (2003) describes the Inoperability Input-Output model (IIM), which is a 
derivative of the Leontief Input-Output model with three major differences. The first is 
the notion of a demand-side perturbation, which is defined as a reduction in demand for a 
particular sector or set of sectors. The second is the introduction of the term inoperability, 
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which is defined as normalized production loss as a direct result of a disruption to an 
industry within the economy. Another interpretation of inoperability is the percentage of 
unrealized production resulting from an economic disturbance compared to the as-
planned production. The third major difference is the creation of the interdependency 
matrix, which quantifies the inoperability relationship each industry has with all others 
within the economy. With these three additions, the production loss in USD from a 
disruption can be calculated (Santos 2003). 
Jiang and Haimes (2004) use the IIM to study the cascading effects of a large-
scale disruption to the economy—such as a terrorist attack, war, or a catastrophic natural 
disaster. The intent of their research is to develop a plan for post-perturbation response to 
minimize the total loss to the economy. Their model achieves this by redistributing 
inoperability as follows. When the as-planned production is not met due to the 
perturbation, that production loss is moved from sectors that benefit the economy most to 
other sectors where it has less effect, thereby allowing the most beneficial or critical 
sectors to thrive and close the gap between as-planned production and actual production 
(Jiang and Haimes 2004). For example, let us assume that electricity is the most 
important sector in the economy and steel is required to make electricity as well as 
automobiles. In response to a disruption that results in a shortfall of steel, it is more 
helpful to the economy as a whole to take steel originally intended to produce 
automobiles and redistribute it to make electricity. Reducing inoperability in the 
electricity sector at the expense of more inoperability in the vehicle sector will result in a 
healthier economy. Jiang and Haimes (2004) showed how optimal resource allocation 
within the economy after the disaster occurred could be beneficial to the public. Their 
study examines the ways in which the U.S. economy can recover after it has been 
attacked or experienced a natural disaster but does not study the effects of limiting trade 
between two countries (Jiang and Haimes 2004). 
Santos and Haimes (2004) use data from the BEA to conduct an interdependency 
analysis on the U.S. economy in the event of an induced demand-side perturbation on the 
airline industry. Their research primarily focuses on the airline industry in a national 
twelve-sector economy. They use this model to estimate the monetary losses to the entire 
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economy resulting from a 10% reduction in demand for airline travel due to a terrorist 
attack. In addition, they rank the sectors that they expect to experience the largest 
production loss in USD. Their ranking system reveals not only the production loss 
associated with each sector, but also the industries from which the general public would 
benefit most if the sectors were made more resilient (Santos and Haimes 2004).  
Jung, Santos, and Haimes (2008) present an international trade IIM (IT-IIM), 
which uses data from the BEA to analyze the effects a potential perturbation at the Port of 
Los Angeles would have on all sectors of the U.S. economy. This study considers two 
types of direct perturbations: (1) a reduction in capacity of the port and (2) restrictions on 
imported goods, also known as an embargo. They limit the IT-IIM to a static analysis of 
the U.S. economy, and their results represent potential economic loss (Jung, Santos, and 
Haimes 2008). 
Wei, Dong, and Sun (2009) use the IIM to study supply chain risk management 
and mitigation strategies. They use a method called the “ordered weighted averaging 
operator” to create the technology matrix for the IIM. They calculate inoperability and 
economic loss metrics to understand the vulnerabilities associated with each node within 
the supply chain system. They use a Monte Carlo simulation to verify their research 
findings (Wei, Dong, and Sun 2009).   
Noting that economic disruptions are not bounded by state lines, Barker, Grant, 
Landers and Pant (2011) use a multi-regional IIM to analyze the cascading effects to 
multiple states within the continental U.S. that could result from a two-week shutdown of 
the port of Catoosa, located on the Arkansas River near Tulsa Oklahoma. They combine 
results from the multi-regional IIM with a simulation of port operations that include 
terminal closure, crane outage and departure stoppage. They estimate a mean loss of 
$37.9 M to the multiregional economy and a loss of $101.9 M when including cascading 
effects to surrounding 10 states (Barker, Grant, Landers and Pant 2011).  
To gain a better understanding of economic effects that influenza has on the 
workforce, Santos, May, and Haimar (2012) conduct an IIM study to analyze the 
consequences when members of the workforce do not show for work within the national 
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capital region (NCR). They measure consequences in terms of economic loss and 
inoperability. Of the 65 sectors they consider, they observe that the top 10 most 
vulnerable sectors account for more than half of the economic losses. These ten sectors 
also appear to contribute the most to the NCR GDP (Santos, May, and Haimar 2012).  
C. DYNAMIC INOPERABILITY INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS 
Lian and Haimes (2006) present an extension to the IIM known as the dynamic 
inoperability input-output model (DIIM). This model includes additional industry 
resilience coefficients that reflect conditional risk mitigation options for each industry 
and a stochastic recovery process. Collectively, these features make it possible to gain an 
understanding of not only how resiliency plays a part in measuring perturbation impact to 
the economy, but also the speed at which it will recover in the event of a terrorist attack 
(Lian and Haimes 2006).  
Christie, Kapur, and Reed (2009) use the DIIM to assess the engineering 
resilience and interconnectedness of a networked infrastructure in the event of a natural 
disaster such as a hurricane. Using data from the aftermath of hurricane Katrina within an 
eleven-system interdependent infrastructure, they obtain results that give insight on how 
to better prepare for such a disaster with respect to needs like power, water and 
telecommunication services (Christie, Kapur, and Reed 2009).  
Jonkerena and Giannopoulosa (2014) use an extension of the DIIM to measure 
economic losses and resilience that may result from the failure of critical infrastructure 
within a particular country’s economy. They use data from the World Input-Output 
database as described by Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, Timmer and de Vries (2015). The 
DIIM assumes that the recovery path for a disrupted economic sector is a concave-up, 
decreasing curve. However, their research offers alternative sector recovery paths that 
depend on the type of disaster experienced. Jonkeren and Giannopoulosa apply this 
model to Europe to consider the impact of a severe winter storm (2014).  
Lian, Santos, and Haimes (2007) use the DIIM to show how a hypothetical cyber-
attack in the Gulf Coast region that could create a five-week shortage in the supply of 
crude oil. They estimate the total loss to the entire economy to be approximately $8 
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billion. In their analysis, they found the Midwest, Gulf Coast, and East Coast of the U.S. 
would be significantly affected but that the West Coast and Rocky Mountain Region 
would suffer negligible economic impacts (Lian, Santos, and Haimes 2007).  
D. MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF INPUT-OUTPUT MODELS  
Snodgrass, Gallagher, and McIntyre (2004) use a Leontief Input-Output model to 
represent, at a macro level, the cascading effects and interactions that take place within a 
military force during combat. In their research, the technology matrix represents resource 
dependencies within the U.S. military force. They use this matrix to capture the cascading 
effects to the entire fighting force when one area of the fighting force is degraded or 
destroyed otherwise not captured in a combat simulation. The goal of their research is to 
develop a military strategy that could assess the damage to the entire military system vice 
singular assets within it (Snodgrass, Gallagher, and McIntyre 2004).  
Gallagher and Shariff (2012) use the Leontief Input-Output model to analyze two 
Air Force budget allocation scenarios. Specifically, they use their model to assess the 
effects of budget reallocation among different entities within the Department of Defense 
(DOD). Their analysis is based on the premise that allocating a greater percentage of the 
DOD budget to one specific area will adversely affect other areas of the DOD. They use 
this model to gain an understanding of the interdependencies among the different budget 
areas within the DOD (Gallagher and Shariff 2012).  
E. OUR CONTRIBUTION IN CONTEXT  
In this thesis, we propose two optimization models. The first, named the Trade 
Sanction Inoperability Input-output Model (TS-IIM), selects the sector or set of sectors 
that, if sanctioned, maximizes production loss (i.e., inoperability) to an adversary. We use 
the TS-IIM to gain insight on the interdependencies of industries within an economy and 
to assess the potential consequences that a U.S. imposed sanction could have on an 
adversary’s entire economy. This information can be used to identify the sectors that, if 
targeted in a sanction, could cause the greatest economic disruption to an adversary’s 
economy. Similarly, this analysis can be used to identify the sectors within our own 
economy that if targeted may pose a significant threat to our national security.  
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The second optimization model, named the Inter-Country Input-Output Model 
(IC-IIM), has the same objective function of the TS-IIM, but it includes a maximum 
tolerance threshold on the repercussions to the United States. As we discover, the 
interconnectedness between countries suggests that careless U.S. sanctioning could result 









A. TRADE SANCTION INOPERABILITY INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
We follow the notation and mathematical development in Santos (2003). The 
basic Leontief input-output model is 
x Ax c  , 
where A  is the (n  n) technology matrix, x  is an (n  1) vector that represents total 
production in each of the interconnected industry sectors, and c  is an (n  1) vector that 
represents the final demand for all sectors. 
Consider a perturbation to final demand to an adversary’s economy created by a 
U.S. sanction restricting all imports from that country, specifically  
ˆ ,c c c     
where ĉ  is the “as-planned” final demand vector,  is the “degraded” final demand 
vector representing the amount of exports from our adversary’s economy excluding 
exports to the U.S., and c  the reduction in final demand. 
This reduction in final demand triggers a reduction in production, x , which we 
describe as  
 
where x̂  is the as-planned production and  is the degraded production. 
Degraded production and degraded demand are linked through the basic Leontief 
equation: 
 x  A  x c . 
From this, Santos (2003) derives the basic inoperability model 




























The matrix,  ˆdiag x  denotes the square matrix whose diagonal entries are the elements 
of x̂ , and whose off-diagonal entries are zero.  
We consider each of these terms in more detail. 
The vector *c  is “the demand-based perturbation vector expressed in terms of the 




*  is the difference between “as-planned” final demand and degraded final 




The vector q is the “demand-based inoperability vector expressed in terms of 




represents the ratio of production loss relative to the “as-planned” production. 
By construction, 0 1iq   for all sectors i. 
The matrix A* is “the interdependency matrix for the demand-based model which 
indicates the degree of coupling of the industry sectors” (Santos 2003, p. 39). 
Equivalently, 
ai, j














* indicates the amount of inoperability contributed to sector i from 
sector j. 
Consider the economy of a foreign country represented using the terms defined 
above. Let ci
US represent the demand for sector i  by the U.S. from our adversary’s 
country, which we assume in practice is equal to the amount of sector i  that is exported 
to the United States. We assume that the U.S. demand for sector i  cannot be replaced by 
demand from another foreign country. Thus, if the U.S. were to completely sanction 
sector i , then it could degrade final demand according to  
  
That is, îc , is the “as-planned” final demand or exports for all sectors i, and ic  is the 
“degraded” final demand for all sectors i. The variable ic  represents the amount of 
exports to all countries from our adversary’s economy excluding exports to the United 
States. The difference between these two values, ci
US, is equal to the amount of sector i  
that is exported to the United States. 










     
Based on these definitions, we introduce the following mathematical program. 
Index Use 





 adversary’s as-planned production for sector iN [millions USD] 
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US  adversary’s as-planned exports to U.S. for sector iN [millions USD] 
a
i, j
*  amount of inoperability contributed to adversary’s economy to sector iN 
from sector jN 
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*  adversary’s normalized demand-based perturbation for sector iN 
s maximum number of sectors that can be targeted in a trade sanction 
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qi adversary’s demand-based inoperability for sector iN 
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The objective function (1.1) sums the production loss in millions of USD for the 
adversary’s entire economy. Constraints (1.2) calculate inoperability for all industries 
within the economy. Constraints (1.3) calculate the normalized demand-based 
perturbation vector based on the sectors of the economy to attack. The assumption is that 
a sector, if targeted, suffers the largest possible decrease in final demand. Constraint (1.4) 
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restricts the number of sanctions or attacks to a specified scalar value. Constraints (1.5) 
stipulate that no value in the demand-based inoperability vector may be less than 0 or 
greater than 1. Constraints (1.6) is a binary constraint where a value of 1 indicates that the 
corresponding sector was sanctioned and the value of 0 indicates that the corresponding 
sector was not sanctioned. 
B. CASE STUDY: CANADIAN 34-SECTOR TRADE SANCTION MODEL 
In this section, we demonstrate how our model can be used to interdict an 
adversary’s economy. To do so, we consider the unilateral trade relationship between 
Canada and the United States. We consider exports from Canada imported into the U.S. 
as potential targets for the sanction. The effect will be a restriction on Canadian goods 
imported into the U.S. from a particular industry. The United States and Canada are 
strong allies; however, conducting an analysis on a country with which there exists a 
strong bilateral trade relationship is helpful to understanding the effects of a sanction, and 
in showing the associated risk that comes with a higher degree of interdependency 
between two economies.  
Throughout our analysis, we use data from the OECD, which standardizes a 
national economy into 34 sectors, defined by the inter-country input-output (ICIO) 
industry list in Figure 1. These sectors are, in turn, a consolidation of 95 industries 





Figure 1.   Industry Breakdown for the 2015 OECD I-O Database. 
Source: Data Sources for Input-Output Database 2015 ed. (2015)  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the standardized 34 sectors that compose an economy according ICIO. Within an 
economy, there are 95 industries according to ISIC and each sector is made up of one or more industries as 
depicted.  
 
Export data for the economy of Canada, of which sectors 19 through 34 total less 
than 1% of all exports, are shown in Table 2. For purposes of this analysis, we assume 




Table 2.   Canadian Industry Sectors for 34-Industry Analysis 
Sector Industry Description Subject to Sanction Exports 
1 TTL_C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing YES $4,578,424,000
2 TTL_C10T14: Mining and quarrying YES $53,345,194,000
3 TTL_C15T16: Food products, beverages and tobacco YES $10,976,995,000
4 TTL_C17T19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear YES $3,206,385,000
5 TTL_C20: Wood and products of wood and cork YES $14,403,424,000
6 TTL_C21T22: Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing YES $14,849,182,000
7 TTL_C23: Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel YES $12,238,648,000
8 TTL_C24: Chemicals and chemical products YES $18,039,237,000
9 TTL_C25: Rubber and plastics products YES $8,574,877,000
10 TTL_C26: Other non-metallic mineral products YES $2,114,611,000
11 TTL_C27: Basic metals YES $16,432,853,000
12 TTL_C28: Fabricated metal products YES $5,369,976,000
13 TTL_C29: Machinery and equipment, nec YES $13,100,999,000
14 TTL_C30T33X: Computer, Electronic and optical equipment YES $10,422,383,000
15 TTL_C31: Electrical machinery and apparatus, nec YES $4,122,905,000
16 TTL_C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers YES $66,000,396,000
17 TTL_C35: Other transport equipment YES $8,755,102,000
18 TTL_C36T37: Manufacturing nec; recycling YES $6,227,086,000
19 TTL_C40T41: Electricity, gas and water supply NO 
           <1% 
20 TTL_C45: Construction NO 
21 TTL_C50T52: Wholesale and retail trade; repairs NO 
22 TTL_C55: Hotels and restaurants NO 
23 TTL_C60T63: Transport and storage NO 
24 TTL_C64: Post and telecommunications NO 
25 TTL_C65T67: Financial intermediation NO 
26 TTL_C70: Real estate activities NO 
27 TTL_C71: Renting of machinery and equipment NO 
28 TTL_C72: Computer and related activities NO 
29 TTL_C73T74: R&D and other business activities NO 
30 
TTL_C75: Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security NO 
31 TTL_C80: Education NO 
32 TTL_C85: Health and social work NO 
33 TTL_C90T93: Other community, social and personal services NO 
34 TTL_C95: Private households with employed persons NO  
Table 2 shows the 34 Canadian Industry sectors, a description of what comprises them, the amount of 
exports to the U.S. in USD for year 2005 and indicates which sectors are subject to a sanction. Source: 
OECD 
 
We follow the notation and mathematical development of the National 12-
Industry Sector Case Study in Santos (2003). Accordingly, we must first generate the 
Leontief Technical coefficient matrix A  for year 2005. We achieve this by collecting 
data from the OECD database of Input-Output tables, specifically the table titled, 
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“LEONTFT: Leontief Inverse Matrix (total)” for Canada in year 2005. We denote this 










At this point in his analysis, Santos (2003) generates the “as-planned” final 
demand vector ĉ  and subsequently calculates the “as-planned” production vector ˆ.x  
However, given the availability of data from the OECD database, we first generate the 
“as-planned” production vector x̂  and then calculate the “as-planned” final demand 
vector ĉ .  
Within the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) Database the “as-planned” 
production vector x̂  for year 2005 is titled, “PROD Production (gross output), current 
prices.” This vector is in Canadian dollars and must be converted to USD.  
Following Santos (2003) and according to the basic Leontief input-output model, 
we are given  
ˆ ˆ .̂x Ax c   
Manipulating this equation to calculate ĉ , we arrive equivalently at 
ˆ ˆ ˆ.c x Ax   
When inspecting the OECD production data for Canada in 2005, we observe that
x̂  has two missing production values for sectors 28 and 29. As can be seen in Figure 1, 
sector 28 is composed of industry 72 and sector 29 is composed of industries 73 and 74. 
However, the only data available is the sum of industries 71 through 74 (C71T74) and the 
value of industry 71 (C71), as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2.  Data for Industries C71T74 and C71. Source: OECD Structural 
Analysis (STAN) Database (2015) 
 
Figure 2 shows raw 2005 production data collected from the OECD STAN Database for industries 
C71T74 and C71.  
 
We find the sum of sectors 28 and 29 for year 2005 according to 
28 29ˆ ˆx C71T74 - C71.x   
We assume that “as-planned” final demand for these sectors is nonnegative and 

















Although there are multiple solutions to these equations, we use the values 28x̂ = 
$34,500,000,000 and 29x̂ = $103,500,000,000. These production values meet all 
constraints with the system of equations. 
Santos (2003) calculates the demand-based interdependency matrix *A  using  
 *, , ˆ ˆ .i j i j j ia a x x  













where the “as-planned” exports to the U.S. for year 2005, USic , is generated from the 
OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database in goods and is titled, “Bilateral Trade by 
Industry and End-use.” To account for sectors that are not subject to sanction we assume 
0 , 19, 20, 21...34 .USic i    
At this point, we have all necessary input data to perform our analysis.  
C. RESULTS: CANADIAN 34 SECTOR TRADE SANCTION MODEL 
The purpose of the Trade Sanction Inoperability Input-Output Model (TS-IIM) is 
to calculate the economic impact of trade sanctions imposed on an adversary’s country. 
The two metrics that Santos (2003) emphasizes are inoperability and production loss. 
Results from the Canadian 34-sector analysis appear in Table 3, and include additional 
metrics. 
Table 3 lists, in descending rank order, the sectors that if attacked will create the 
largest impact (i.e., product loss) on the Canadian economy as a whole. The corresponding 
sector number (“Sector”) and description (“Sector Description”) are shown for each. 
Continuing from left to right, the remaining columns in Table 3 are headed as 
follows: 
 *ic  is the percent reduction in demand for each sector by means of U.S. 
trade sanction.  
 iq is the inoperability or the normalized percentage of production not 
realized for each sector.  
 ix  represents the production loss in USD for each sector.  
 i
i
x is the production loss in USD to the entire Canadian economy.  
 34i
i
q  is the average inoperability among 34 sectors.  
 i i
i
x x   represents the percentage of production loss to the entire 
Canadian economy that can be attributed to the sector that was attacked.   
 ˆi i
i i
x x  , the final column, represents the percentage of total production 
loss to the entire Canadian economy in USD for each sector attacked.  
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Table 3.   Results from 2005 Canadian 34 Sector Trade Sanction Analysis 
 
Table 3 shows the results from the 2005 Canadian 34 Sector Trade Sanction Analysis. The results are in descending order and identify the sectors of the 




Recall that the premise of this research is to identify the optimal design of an 
economic sanction by answering the first two of the original thesis research questions 
below. 
 
1. Which sector of an adversary’s economy should be targeted to maximize 
the impact on its economy as a whole? 
2. Which sector of an adversary’s economy should be targeted to maximize 
the impact on a specific sector? 
3. To what extent are sanctions effective tools for economic warfare? 
Regarding question 1, for year 2005, the sector within the Canadian economy that 
should be targeted to maximize the impact on the entire economy is sector 16, 
“TTL_C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers.” According to the results, a 
demand based perturbation *16 .56c  results in 16 1q   rendering sector 16 inoperable. The 
“as-planned” production x̂  in 2005 was $108.6 billion USD. Since 16 1q  , 16x  is equal 
to $108.6 billion USD, this would be the largest production loss value when compared to 
all other sectors. The total production loss to the entire economy, i
i
x , with a demand 
based perturbation *16 .56c   results in the greatest production loss of $193.3 billion USD. 
The average inoperability, 34i
i
q , is greatest when sector 16 is sanctioned and results 
in a value of .0732, which is 3.6x greater than the industry with a rank order of 2. The 
column header,	 i i
i
x x  , can be interpreted as an interconnectedness ratio. A smaller 
percentage means that particular industry is more interconnected with the entire 
economy. In contrast, a larger percentage means that a demand-based perturbation will be 
more contained, reflecting a smaller degree of interconnectedness. Within Table 3, the 
interconnectedness ratio ( i i
i
x x  ) results range from 41.50% to 74.86%. For sector 
16, the interconnectedness ratio 16 i
i
x x   has a value of 56.17%, meaning that 
56.17% of the production loss is a result of the industry that was sanctioned. The 
complement, 43.83%, is the ratio of production loss to all other sectors of the economy 
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capturing the cascading effects. With respect to this metric, sector 16 ranks as the 12th 
most interconnected sector. The ratio of production loss in USD to the entire economy is 
ˆi i
i i
x x   and sector 16 has a value of 7.83%. The second largest production loss 
ratio to the entire economy is 3.23% and is attributed from sector 2, “TTL_C10T14: 
Mining and quarrying.” Regarding question 2, we found that the best way to maximize 
the impact on a specific sector was to sanction that sector directly. Indirect sanctions in 
every case proved to be suboptimal. Regarding question 3, the results that were found 
using the TS-IIM suggest that trade sanctions can be effective tools to conduct economic 
warfare.  
The results presented in Table 3 are not surprising and can be understood with 
historical knowledge of the Canadian automotive industry. Dykes and Anastakis (2006) 
document the history of the automotive history in Canada and note that in 1904 the 
production of the Ford Model “C” began in Ontario to avoid a 35% import tax into 
Canada. Demand for the production of vehicles in Canada grew as a result of World War 
I, and in 1965 the Automotive Products Trade Agreement (“Auto Pact”) was formed. The 
Auto Pact was formed to establish duty-free trade for automobiles and automotive parts 
between Canada and the United States. Prior to this agreement tariffs on Canadian 
exports into the U.S. ranged between 17.5% and 25%. With the Auto Pact in place, the 
Canadian Automotive industry grew rapidly between the mid-1960s and 1970s. However, 
with that growth the Canadian and U.S. automotive industries because more 
interdependent making our economies more interdependent.  
The Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers’ Association (CVMA) acts as an advocate 
for the Canadian automotive industry. They use industry research and government 
relations to reach their objectives. According to the CVMA (2011), “In 1964, prior to the 
signing of the Auto Pact, Canada produced 671,000 vehicles. By 2007, this number had 
reached 2.56 million, maintaining Ontario as the largest auto assembly jurisdiction in 
North America” (Canadian Vehicle Manufacturer’s Association 2011). The CVMA 
(2011) also states, “The automotive sector is one of the most important industries in 
Canada. One in seven Canadians is either directly or indirectly employed in the 
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automotive industry. It is one of Canada’s most strategic business sectors and is the 
single biggest contributor to Canada’s manufacturing Gross Domestic Product (GDP)” 
(CVMA 2011). This statement supports the results in Table 3 from the TS-IIM. 
Given the strong bilateral trade relationship between the U.S. and Canada, in the 
event that the U.S. decided to sanction the Canadian economy would there be any 
repercussions? Can those repercussions be quantified? Will a sanction on particular 
sectors within the Canadian economy result in effects that are counterproductive to the 
health of the U.S. economy? In the next chapter, we propose two methods that address 







IV. CALCULATING TRADE SANCTION REPERCUSSIONS 
We are interested in measuring the negative repercussions to the U.S. of imposing 
a sanction on sectors in another country. 
A. INTER-COUNTRY INOPERABILITY INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL 
The OECD database has an Inter-Country Input-Output (ICIO) table that shows 
the sector interdependencies for countries and regions around the world. Table 4 displays 
the countries and regions included in the ICIO table. There are a total of 62 countries and 
regions included in the ICIO table. Mexico and China have multiple regions represented 
in the ICIO table. 
Table 4.   ICIO Table Countries and Regions. Adapted from Data Sources for 
Input-Output Database 2015 ed. (2015)  
Country Code Description Country Code Description Country Code Description 
AUS Australia CYP Cyprus MEX.GMF Mexico Global Manufacturing
ARG Argentina GRC Greece ROU Romania 






BGR Bulgaria HUN Hungary RUS Russian Federation 
BEL Belgium HRV Croatia NLD Netherlands 
BRA Brazil ISL Iceland SAU Saudi Arabia 
CAN Canada IDN Indonesia NZL New Zealand 
BRN Brunei Darussalam IRL Ireland SGP Singapore 
CHL Chile IND India NOR Norway 
CHN China ISR Israel THA Thailand 
CZE Czech Republic KHM Cambodia POL Poland 
CHN.DOM China Domestic sales only ITA Italy TUN Tunisia 
DNK Denmark LTU Lithuania PRT Portugal 
CHN.PRO China Processing JPN Japan TWN Chinese Taipei 
EST Estonia LVA Latvia SVK Slovak Republic 
CHN.NPR China Non processing goods exporters KOR Korea VNM Viet Nam 
FIN Finland MLT Malta SVN Slovenia 
COL Colombia LUX Luxembourg ZAF South Africa 
FRA France MYS Malaysia ESP Spain 
CRI Costa Rica MEX Mexico RoW Rest of the world 




The values within the ICIO table represent the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) 
from row j  to column i . The ICIO table quantifies for the entire year the TiVA from 
each sector within a particular country to all other sectors for countries found within 
Table 4. 
Consider a subset of the ICIO table including only the U.S. and Canada as 
countries. Furthermore, let B  denote the subset of this matrix associated with only the 
TiVA from U.S. to Canada (see Figure 3). 
Figure 3.  The Matrix B Represents the Trade in Value Added (TiVA) from a 
Sector j in the U.S. to a Sector i in Canada. 
 
Within Figure 3, there are four quadrants or matrices. As stated previously the 
matrix that we will use for the analysis is labeled B. In order to understand what matrix B 
depicts it may be easier to interpret the rows j as export sectors and the columns i as 
import sectors. When a sanction is issued from the U.S. to Canada, the buying capacity of 
Canada is reduced as well. When this occurs, fewer commodities are exported from the 
U.S. to Canada, and the U.S. economy is negatively impacted.  
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Table 5 shows actual values for the matrix B  for the year 2005. The elements 
within Table 5 express the aggregate amount of TiVA contributed from U.S. sector row 
to Canadian sector column. Let ,j ib  represent the amount of TiVA contributed from U.S. 
row j  to Canadian column i . In the case of Table 5, this shows how the U.S. affects 
Canada. 
Let B  represent the ICIO table and v  represent the as planned value added. In a 
manner analogous to *A , we define the matrix *B , called the Inter-Country 
interdependency matrix, as, 
    1* diag diagB v B v    . 
The matrix,  diag v , denotes the square matrix whose diagonal entries are the 
elements of v , and whose off-diagonal entries are zero.  
From *B  we can calculate the negative repercussions to the U.S. resulting from a 
sanction on Canada affecting the buying capacity of the Canadian economy. Specifically 




b  , 
where *,j ib  is the amount of inoperability contributed from Canadian sector column i  to 









Table 5.   U.S. and Canada ICIO Table (Matrix B) 
 
Table 5 shows a subset of matrix B for sectors 1–18 in year 2005. The elements within this matrix represent the aggregate amount of trade in value added 
contributed from U.S. sector row to Canadian sector column in millions of USD. 
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Using the ICIO matrix in this manner preserves the notion of inoperability in our 
analysis, as the matrix B* quantifies the inoperability contributed from Canadian column 
sector i to U.S. row sector j. That is, a reduction in Canadian buying power creates a 
demand-side perturbation for the U.S. economy.   
We now assume that there is a limit on the total repercussion that the U.S. is 
willing to accept when imposing a sanction. We denote this as v .  
This leads to the following formulation for the Inter-Country Inoperability Input-
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The objective function (1.1) and constraints (1.2)-(1.6) are as above. Constraint 
(1.7) puts a limit on the acceptable repercussion to the U.S., measured in loss of Trade In 
Value Added (TiVA) to the U.S. economy. The TS-IIM did not consider the negative 
consequences to the U.S.; however, the IC-IIM does by means of constraint (1.7). With 
this addition, we hope to identify sanctions that maximize production loss within our 
adversary’s country while staying below a tolerable threshold for loss of TiVA.  
We note that our focus on demand-side inoperability ignores any direct supply-
side repercussions to the U.S. economy; in essence, we assume that any commodities 
previously imported from Canada can be replaced or substituted with commodities 
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obtained elsewhere. However, in situations where Canada exports a rare commodity—
one without replacement or a suitable substitution—to the United States exclusively, the 
matrix in the lower left corner of Figure 3 could be used for analysis. In what follows, we 
focus exclusively on demand-side inoperability as described above. 
B. RESULTS: INTER-COUNTRY INOPERABILITY INPUT-OUTPUT 
MODEL 
The first step in using the IC-IIM is to calculate the repercussion to the U.S. when 
sanctioning each sector i in Canada, measured as the total trade in value lost, i . Table 6 
lists these repercussions, ordered from low-to-high in value for i . In addition, Table 6 
displays the lost value to Canada. We observe that a sanction on sector 16, “TTL_C34: 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” not only has the largest impact on Canada 
($193B), but also the largest repercussion to the U.S. ($25B). 
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Table 6.   Repercussions in Lost Value to U.S. when Sanctioning Sectors in Canada (Year 2005 Data) 
 
Table 6 shows the repercussion to the U.S. when sanctioning each sector i of Canada, for sectors 1–18 in year 2005. Rows are rank ordered (from low to high) 












is the amount of TiVA in USD lost by the U.S. for every $1 USD in 
production lost by the Canadian economy. This metric assesses how expensive a sanction 
is to the United States. Using this metric, the most expensive sanction to the U.S. is sector 
12, “TTL_C28: Fabricated metal products” at a cost $0.33 USD TiVA for every $1 USD 
Canadian production. The second most expensive sanction is sector 1, “TTL_C01T05: 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing” at a cost of $0.23 USD TiVA for every $1 
USD Canadian production. The third most expensive sanction is sector 6, “TTL_C21T22: 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing” at a cost of $0.19 USD TiVA for 
every $1 USD Canadian production. 
The results in Table 6 show clearly that the interconnected nature of the U.S. and 
Canadian economies means that a sanction on Canada can have potentially serious 
economic repercussions to the U.S. We now turn to the IC-IIM to consider how to target 
individual sectors in the Canadian economy optimally while limiting repercussions to our 
own economy. 
Table 7 shows the optimal solution *iy  for all  1,2,3,...30v  in billions of USD, 
with the additional restriction 18i
i





Table 7.   IC-IIM Results for U.S. and Canada (Year 2005) 
 
Table 7 provides the optimal solutions for iy given different budget for repercussion ( v ). Black cells indicate attacks that are infeasible because the 
repercussion of sanctioning that sector alone exceeds the given budget. The two rightmost columns provide information about how often sectors are sanctioned 
given different values of v . The unit for the bottom three rows are billions of USD. 
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Consider, as an example, the case where we have a maximum $5v billion  in 
allowable repercussions.  In this case, there are four sectors sanctioned, namely sectors 2, 
4, 5, and 15. The sum of all production loss, i
i
x , to the Canadian economy given 
these four sanctions is $128.7 billion. The total trade in value lost, i i
i
y experienced by 
the U.S. for the four sectors sanctioned is $4.8 billion.  
Of the 18 sectors that are subject to a sanction, sector 5, “TTL_C20: Wood and 
products of wood and cork,” was sanctioned for every value of v .  The second most 
sanctioned sector is sector 4, “C17T19: Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” 
for a total of 28 times. The third most sanctioned sector is sector 15, “C31: Electrical 
machinery and apparatus, nec” for a total of 27 times. This raises the question as to why 
these sectors are sanctioned more frequently than others. What we found were that these 






making these the cheapest 






equal to $0.01, 
$0.05 and $0.05, respectively.  
Sectors 1, 6, 12, and 16 were not sanctioned for any value of v  .These sectors are, 
“TTL_C01T05: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing,” “TTL_C21T22: Pulp, paper, 
paper products, printing and publishing,” “TTL_C28: Fabricated metal products” and 
“TTL_C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers,” respectively. When assessing why 







and i . As stated previously the three most expensive sectors to sanction are 
sectors 6, 1, and 12 at a cost of $0.33, $0.23, and $0.19, respectively. In regard to sector 
16, we have concluded that it is relatively inexpensive when observing TiVA loss, but the 
aggregate loss given a complete sanction of sector 16 results in a $25.5 billion value for 





The primary goal of this research is to identify the optimal design of an economic 
trade sanction based on the resulting estimated production loss experienced by an 
adversary’s economy. Expanding upon the mathematical development in Santos (2003) 
and using data from the OECD database, we develop the TS-IIM. For purposes of 
demonstration and validation, we pose a hypothetical scenario in which the U.S. and 
Canada are adversaries instead of allied nations. Specifically, our analysis using the TS-
IIM identifies sector 16, “TTL_C34: Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” as the 
sector to sanction within Canada to create the largest estimated production loss, which we 
approximate to be $193.3 billion. Further investigation helps us to gain an understanding 
as to why exports of sector 16 from Canada to the U.S. would be so detrimental to the 
health of the Canadian economy if sanctioned. A long history of bilateral trade between 
the two nations specifically with the automotive industry dating back to 1965 has allowed 
tariff- free trade between the two nations. For greater than half a century, the bilateral 
trade relationship between the U.S. and Canada has resulted in higher economic 
interdependency between the two nations, thus making sector 16 of considerable 
importance to the economy of Canada.  
Given the strong dependence by Canada on the U.S., is it reasonable to expect 
that a sanction of sector 16 by the U.S. could result in economic repercussions? In 
response to this question, we present the IC-IIM, which extends the TS-IIM but also 
considers the trade in value loss (TiVA) the U.S. economy will experience. This allows 
us to prevent a scenario that leads to mutual economic destruction of the U.S. and 
Canadian economies. In particular, a sanction on sector 16 as indicated in Table 3 without 
gaining an understanding of the repercussions to the U.S. the effects could be detrimental 
to the economic health of the United States.    
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B. FUTURE WORK 
There are four enhancements to the IC-IIM that could be beneficial to this field of 
study. The first would be to consider partial sanctions. Currently, if a sector is sanctioned 
then the entire sector is sanctioned. However, if we consider partial sanctions along with 
the tradeoff cost of a sanction, the optimal sectors to target would likely change.  
The second enhancement would address how employment within each sector is 
impacted given a reduction in demand. Given a reduction in demand there will be a 
reduction in production thus a reduction in the size of each sectors workforce. This would 
give us another layer to the narrative of how each economy is impacted. 
The third enhancement to the IC-IIM would be to include as many countries as 
possible in the model instead of just the U.S. and Canada. This would allow us to observe 
not only the repercussions from U.S.-issued sanctions, but also the indirect repercussions 
issued by allied countries, creating a multilateral IC-IIM. 
The final improvement would be to create a user-friendly graphical interface to 
allow policy makers and politicians the ability to conduct this type of analysis 
independently. The purpose of this tool would be to gain a rough understanding of the 
impact to all countries impacted directly or indirectly.  
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